## LAW AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

### ePrivacy

Prof. Gerrit-Jan Zwenne February 9th, 2022



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## Council of the EU Released a (New) Draft of the ePrivacy Regulation

By Dan Cooper and Anna Oberschelp de Meneses on January 6, 2021 FOSTED IN DATA PRIVACY, EU DATA PROTECTION, EUROPEAN UNION, GDPR

On January 5, 2021, the Council of the European Union released a ne . draft version of the ePrivacy Regulation, which is meant to replace the ePrivacy Directive.


The European Commission approved a first draft of the ePrivacy Regulation in January 2017. The draft regulation has since then been under discussion in the Council.


On January 1, 2021, Portugal took over the presidency of the Council for six months. Ahead of the next meeting of the Council's working party responsible for the draft ePrivacy Regulation, the Portugues Presidency issued a revised version of the draft regulation. This is to 14th draft version of the ePrivacy Regulation (including the European Commission's instiduant).

Once approved, the ePrivacy Regulation will set out requirements and limitations for publicly available electronic communications service providers ("service providers") processing data of, or accessing devices belonging to, natural and legal persons "who are in the [European] Union" ("end-user"). The regulation aims to safeguard the privacy of the end-users, the confidentiality of their communications, and the integrity of their devices. These requirements and limitations will apply uniformly in all EU Member States. However, EU Member States have the power to restrict the scope of these requirements and limitations where this is a "necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard one or more of the general public interests."














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Art. 33-34 GDPR Art. 4(3) ePD

breach notification

notify the personal data breach to the competent national authority

also notify the subscriber or individual, if likely to adversely affect the personal data or privacy of a subscriber or individual, f the breach without undue delay

24 hours? 72 hours? what's the startingpoint?

#### breach notification to DPA


In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it, notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority [...], unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons


## notification to data subject


When the personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall communicate the personal data breach to the data subject without undue delay.





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#### Main findings: the TCF implies the processing of personal data


Contrary to IAB Europe's claims, the Litigation Chamber of the BE DPA found that IAB Europe is acting as a data controller with respect to the registration of individual users' consent signal, objections and preferences by means of a unique Transparency and Consent (TC) String, which is linked to an identifiable user. This means that IAB Europe can be held responsible for possible violations of the GDPR.

The BE DPA identified a series of GDPR infringements by IAB Europe :

- Lawfulness: IAB Europe failed to establish a legal basis for the processing of the TC String, and the legal grounds offered by the TCF for the subsequent processing by adtech vendors are inadequate;
- Transparency and information of the users: the information provided to users through the CMP interface is too generic
  and vague to allow users to understand the nature and scope of the processing, especially given the complexity of the
  TCF. Therefore it is difficult for users to maintain control over their personal data;
- Accountability, security and data protection by design/by default: In the absence of organisational and technical
  measures in accordance with the principle of data protection by design and by default, including to ensure the effective
  exercise of data subject rights as well as to monitor the validity and integrity of the users' choices, the conformity of the
  TCF with the GDPR is not adequately warranted nor demonstrated;
- Other obligations pertaining to a controller processing personal data on a large-scale: IAB Europe has failed to keep a
  register of processing activities, to appoint a DPO and to conduct a "DPIA" (data protection impact assessment).



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where technically possible and feasible [...] consent may be expressed by using the appropriate technical settings of a software application enabling access to the internet.



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Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment









(aa) Making access to website content provided without direct monetary payment dependent on the consent of the end-user to the storage and reading of cookies for additional purpose would normally not be considered s depriving the enduser of a genuine choice if the end-user is able to choose between services, on the basis of clear, precise and user-friendly information about the purposes of cookies and similar techniques, between an offer that includes consenting to the use of cookies for additional purposes on the one hand, and an equivalent offer by the same provider that does not involve consenting to data use for additional purposes, on the other hand. Conversely, in some cases, making access to website content dependent on consent to the use of such cookies may be considered, in the presence o a clear imbalance between the end-user and the service provider as depriving the end-user of a genuine choice. This would normally be the case for websites providing certain services, such as those provided by public authorities. Similarly, such imbalance could exist where the end-user has only few or no alternatives to the service, and thus has no real choice as to the usage of cookies for instance in case of service providers in a dominant position.

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#### Article 8

Protection of end-users' terminal equipment information stored in terminal equipment of endusers and related to or processed by or emitted by end-users' terminal such equipment


- 1. The use of processing and storage capabilities of terminal equipment and the collection of information from end-users' terminal equipment, including about its software and hardware, other than by the end-user concerned shall be prohibited, except on the following grounds:
- it is necessary for a purpose other than that for which the information have been collected under this Regulation. Where it is not based on the end-user's consent or on a Union or Member State law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 11 the person using processing and storage capabilities or collecting information processed by or emitted by or stored in the end-users' terminal equipment shall, in order to ascertain whether processing for another purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the electronic communications data are initially collected, take into account, inter alia:



## communication without identification




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# unsolicited commercial communication



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questions?

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